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I INTRODUCTION 
In New Zealand arrangements commonly described as joint 
ventures include real estate development and subdivision 
arrangements; financing arrangements; share farming 
arrangements; arrangements in the petroleum and mining 
industries; entertainment arrangements; and arrangements for 
the exploitation of a patent, tradename or copyright. 1 
However there is uncertainty in the law as to what is meant 
by the term "joint venture", and as to the obligations that 
exist between joint venturers. 
This paper attempts to address that uncertainty. First, it 
is shown that the joint venture has not been recognised by 
the law as a business association which is distinct from the 
partnership. Since it will be pertinent to determine in 
each case whether or not the "joint venture" agree?.nent in 
fact creates a partnership, the rules for doing so will be 
reviewed. 
The second part of this paper focuses only on those joint 
ventures which are not partnerships. The issue is whether 
the strict fiduciary standard of conduct will be imposed 
upon those joint venturers. Fiduciary principles are 
outlined briefly, and the special considerations relevant 
where fiduciary obligations are imposed on parties to a 
contract are examined. Finally, an approach to the question 
whether fiduciary obligations are owed to joint venturers is 
selected and applied . 
1 J Maxton "Joint Venture or Partnership?" (1987) 4 BCB 221, 221. 
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II IS THE JOINT VENTURE A LEGALLY DISTINCTIVE BUSINESS 
ASSOCIATION? 
A Other Jurisdictions 
The term "joint venture" (or "joint adventure" - the two are 
synonymous) was first used in Scotland and England in the 
eighteenth century to describe trading voyages where two or 
more persons agreed to put money into a common stock. 2 
English Courts did not develop the concept and cases using 
the term have mainly been concerned with whether the 
arrangement created a partnership. The term was not 
generally used to describe anything different from a 
partnership. 3 
American courts claim to have taken the initiative in 
recognising the joint venture as a legal association sui 
generis. 4 It is true that there is a vast amount of 
academic writing and caselaw tracing the development of the 
joint venture in America, but there is still no broadly 
accepted definition. 5 The result is that joint ventures, 
although recognised as a separate category of relationship, 
are largely governed by partnership principles. 6 For example 
7 joint venturers are probably mutual agents as are partners; 
and joint ventures are treated partnerships for tax 
2 J D Merralls "Mining and Petroleum Joint Ventures in Australia: Some 
Basic Legal Concepts" (1981) 3 AMPLJ 1, 1. 
3 G L J Ryan "Joint Venture Agreements" (1982) 4 AMPLJ 101, 101-105; 
Halsburys Laws of England (4ed, Butterworths, London, 1980) vol 35, para 
8, p8. 
4 Crane Co v Stokke (1937) 110 ALR 761 cited in W HE Jaeger (ed) 
Williston on the Law of Contracts (3 ed, Baker, Voorhis & Co.Inc, NY, 
1959) vol 2, para 318, p548. 
5 W HE Jaeger above n4, para 318, p549-550. 
6 W HE Jaeger above n4, para 318B, p585; American Jurisprudence (2d, 
The Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Company, Rochester NY, 1969) 46 
para 4, p24-25; W HE Jaeger "Joint Venture or Partnership?" (1961) 37 
Notre Dame L 138, 141-142. 
7 W HE Jaeger above n4, para 318B, p590; Am Jur above n6, para 4, 
p24-25. 
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purposes8 and for the purposes of liability to third 
t . 9 par 1es. 
The recognition of the joint venture as a separate category 
of relationship perhaps initially arose only to avoid the 
rule of American partnership law that a corporate body 
cannot enter into a partnership.
10 But whatever the reason 
for it; the historical anomaly of treating a joint venture 
as a partnership yet recognising it as a separate legal 
category, has recently become the subject of criticism. 
11 
In Canada, emphasis is not placed on whether the "joint 
venture" is a different type of business association from 
the partnership. The courts often neglect to categorise the 
relationship, and go directly to the question what 
principles should be applied to the relationship. Commonly 
an agreement called a "joint venture" by the parties will 
have partnership principles applied to it.
12 In the 
Canadian mining and petroleum industries, through customary 
usage, the joint venture has taken on special 
characteristics. 13 Joint venture law has become a rapidly 
developing field in this industry;
14 mining and petroleum 
joint ventures are discussed below. 
8 W HE Jaeger above n4, para 3188, p585. 
9 W HE Jaeger above n4, para 3188, p589. 
10 This prohibition on companies entering partnerships arises from the 
fear that directors will abdicate their responsibities and commit the 
company to a course of action by which assets may be jeapardised in an 
ultra vires manner: W HE Jaeger above n4, para 3188, p589; H W Nichols 
"Joint Ventures" (1950) 36 Virginia LR 425, 444-445; 
11 A B Weissburg "Reviewing the Law on Joint Ventures with an Eye 
Toward the Future" (1990) 63 Southern California LR 487. 
12 Central Mortgage & Housing Corp v Graham (1973), 43 DLR (3d) 686 
cited in J s Ziegal, R L Daniels, D L Johnston, & JG Macintosh Cases & 
Materials on Partnerships and Canadian Business Corporations (2d, The 
Carswell Company Ltd, Toronto, 1989) vol 1, 72. 
13 R Bartlett Mining Law in Canada (University of Saskatchewan, 
Continuing Legal Education, Law Society of Saskatchewan, Canada, 1984) 
172; R G Powers "Limited Partnerships in the Oil and Gas Industry"(l978) 
16 Alberta LR 153, 210 . 
14 "Annual Seminars on Oil and Gas Law'' Petroleum Law editions, 
reported in Alberta LR. 
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In Australia the joint venture is used extensively for small 
and very large projects alike. But there is relatively 
little caselaw or legislation addressing the definition of 
"joint venture". Ryan was able to find only five Australian 
authorities which support the view that the "joint venture" 
and the "partnership" are distinct, mutually exclusive legal 
concepts. 15 In the two leading cases on the topic; Canny 
Gabriel Castle Jackson Advertising Pty Ltd v Volume Sales 
(Finance) Pty Ltd16 and United Dominions Corporation Ltd v 
Brian Pty Ltd and Others17 ; the High Court of Australia held 
that agreements expressed as joint ventures were, on the 
facts, partnerships. But their Honours recognised that a 
joint venture need not be a partnership in other cases. 
Little guidance as to the definition of "joint venture" can 
be had from these jurisdictions. The only jurisdiction 
which clearly distinguishes the joint venture from the 
partnership is the American jurisdiction. However it is 
submitted that drawing from the American law would be likely 
to produce confusion, since the authorities are by no means 
consistent. 18 Common law in England, Canada and Australia 
seems to regard the "joint venture" as something which may 
or may not be a partnership. 
followed this approach. 
B New Zealand Cases. 
The New Zealand cases have 
Despite the widespread use of the joint venture in New 
Zealand commercial practice, the author could find only two 
cases which directly addressed the issue of what a ''joint 
venture" is. 
15 G L J Ryan above n3, 117. 
16 (1974) 131 CLR 321.. 
17 (1985) 59 ALJR 676. 
18 G L J Ryan above n3, 146. 
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19 In Marr v Arabco Traders Ltd , although ultimately 
Tompkins J did not find it necessary to categorise the 
relationship as a joint venture, a partnership or some other 
relationship20 , he adopted the following passage from UDC v 
. 21 Brian: 
The term "joint venture" is not a technical one with a 
settled common law meaning. As a matter of ordinary 
language, it connotes an association of persons for the 
purposes of a particular trading, commercial, mining or 
other financial undertaking or endeavour with a view to 
mutual profit, with each participant usually (but not 
necessarily), contributing money, property or skill. Such a 
joint venture (or, under Scots' law "adventure") will often 
be a partnership. The term is, however, apposite to refer 
to a joint undertaking or activity carried out through a 
medium other that a partnership; such as a company, a trust, 
an agency or joint ownership. The borderline between what 
should more properly be seen as no more than a simple 
contractual relationship may, on occasion, be blurred. 
In the more recent case of Commerce Commission v Fletcher 
Challenge & Ors 22 it was necessary to consider whether 
Fletcher Challenge and Brierly Investments Ltd were in a 
joint venture in order to determine whether they had 
breached the requirements of the Commerce Act 1986. The 
b f . 23 . . t a ove passage rom UDC v Brian was again given suppor. 
McGechan J after considering the various authorities said: 24 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
I think some care is needed in relation to any sweeping 
definition. The New Zealand commercial world on my 
perception has embraced the label "joint venture" without 
necessarily thinking deeply as to its meaning or 
implications. I suspect in many cases the pivotal motive 
has been to endeavour to avoid the creation of a partnership 
with its possibilities of joint and several unlimited 
liability. Obviously, to raise a joint venture something 
more is needed than mere co-ownership or contractual 
relationship .... What is required to progress matters onward 
to joint venture status is some contractual "association of 
persons for the purposes of a particular trading, 
(1987) 1 NZBLC 102 732. 
Above n19, 102 747. 
Above n19, 102 744 citing UDC v Brian above n17, 679. 
[1989] 2 NZLR 554. 
Above n17, 679. 
Above n22, 615-616. 
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commercial .•• undertaking with a view to mutual profit": UDC 
v Brian Pty Ltd .•.• There must be that further joint effort 
or input with a view to profit resulting, or as put more 
concisely by the High Court of Australia {above) "a joint 
undertaking or activity" ...• Once the matter is so stated, 
as indeed the High Court of Australia appears to recognise, 
there may well be an overlap between so called joint 
venture, and partnership as classically understood. Indeed, 
it may be that partnership is simply a specialised 
development of one area of joint venture. 
"Joint venture" then, is a loose term, used to describe a 
generally unincorporated business association which may or 
may not be a partnership. The question in each particular 
case is whether the agreement between the parties has 
created a partnership or not. 
III DECIDING WHETHER THE JOINT VENTURE IS A PARTNERSHIP IN 
ANY PARTICULAR CASE 
A The New Zealand Partnership Act 1908 
The Partnership Act 1908 section 4(1) gives the following 
definition of a partnership: "Partnership is the relation 
which subsists between persons carrying on a business in 
common with a view to a profit." 
Section 4(2) expressly excludes companies from the ambit of 
the definition. Section 5 lays down rules for determining 
the existence of a partnership: co-ownership of property 
does not of itself create a partnership, neither does the 
sharing of gross returns. But receipt by a person of a 
share of the profits, or of a payment contingent or varying 
with the profits of a business, is prima facie evidence of a 
partnership. 
The statutory definition of partnership in section 4 can be 
broken down into three elements: 
(1) a business must be carried on 
(2) it must be carried on by persons in common 
(3) it must be carried on with a view to profit 
I 
I 
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If one of these elements is not present then the arrangement 
under consideration is not a partnership. 
Attempts have been made to distinguish the joint venture 
from the partnership by arguing that one of the three 
elements in the statutory definition of "partnership" is 
missing for the joint venture. 
For example in American law it has been seen that a 
distinction is made between joint ventures and partnerships 
but that there is no universally accepted basis for this 
d . t ' t ' 
25 h · · is inc ion. Te basis used most frequently by Judges and 
commentators to distinguish the joint venture from the 
partnership is that joint venturers are not "carrying on a 
business". The suggestion is that, unlike partnerships, 
joint ventures are limited to a single ad hoe business 
t t
. 26 ransac ion. 
The Australian High Court has repeatedly rejected this 
27 distinction as untenable. In UDC v Brian Dawson J said a 
single one-off undertaking may amount to "carrying on a 
business 11 : 28 
Whilst the phrase "carrying on a business" contains an 
element of continuity or repetition in contrast with an 
isolated transaction which is not to be repeated, the 
decision of this Court in Canny Gabriel Castle Jackson 
Advertising Pty Ltd v Volume Sales (Finance) Pty Ltd (1974) 
131 CLR 321 suggests that the emphasis which will be placed 
upon continuity may not be heavy. 
It is submitted that the position is the same in New Zealand 
and that the parties can be said to be "carrying on a 
business'' even though their relationship exists to carry out 
25 Above Part II A. 
26 W HE Jaeger above n4, para 318 p521, para 3188 p593; Am Jur above 
n6, para 4 p26; A B Weissburg above nll, 521. 
27 UDC v Brian above n17, 677, 681; Chan v Zacharia (1984) 53 ALR 
417,431. 
28 Above n17, 681. 
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one particular transaction only. 29 Support for this can be 
had from the Partnership Act 1908 itself. Section 35(1) (b) 
provides that if a partnership is entered into for a "single 
adventure or undertaking" then the termination of that 
adventure or undertaking will have the effect of dissolving 
the partnership. This is statutory recognition that a 
coming together of parties for a one-off business 
transaction can come within the definition of "partnership". 
B Common Law 
The Partnership Act 1908 is not a code; rules of the common 
law and equity continue so long as they are consistent with 
the Act. 30 At common law the intentions of the parties are 
paramount when determining whether the arrangement between 
the parties is a partnership. The intentions of the parties 
must be ascertained by looking at the agreement as a whole; 
the mere fact that the parties describe themselves as 
partners is not conclusive. 31 Conversely, the fact that the 
parties describe themselves as "joint venturers" will not be 
h 1 · h h · · t d, d 32 t e cone us1ve tat a partners 1p was not in en e. To 
find the true intentions of the parties the Courts look at 
the substance of the agreement rather than the label. 33 
In Canny Gabriel 34 the majority (McTiernan, Menzies and 
Mason JJ) held that the agreement which described the 
parties as "joint venturers" created a partnership because 
certain "indicia of a partnership" were present on the facts 
29 Re Abenheim, Ex parte Abenheim (1913) 109 LT 219, 220; National 
Insurance Company v Bray (1934] NZLR s67 cited in KL Fletcher (ed) 
Higgins and Fletcher The Law of Partnership in Australia and New Zealand 
(5 ed, The Law Book Company Ltd, Sydney, 1987) 31; Van Dijk v McCracken 
Unreported, 30 June 1987, High Court Christchurch Registry CP 198/87, 
Tipping J. 
30 Partnership Act 1908, s3. 
31 R C I Banks (ed) Lindley and Banks on Partnership (16 ed, Sweet & 
Maxwell, London, 1990) para 5-05, p61. 
32 Above n31, para 5-03, p60-61. 
33 Horne v Pollard (1935] NZLR sl25. 
34 Above n16, 326-327. 
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of the case. The factors included were: 
(1) The parties were involved in a commercial enterprise 
with a view to a profit 
(2) Profits were to be shared 
(3) Policy was a matter for joint agreement and differences 
were to be settled by arbitration 
(4) An assignment of a half interest in the "joint venture" 
contracts was attempted (although unsuccessfully) 
(5) The parties were concerned with the financial stability 
of one another in a way which is common with partners. 
These factors were cited with approval in UDC v Brian35 as 
providing criteria to determine whether a joint venture 
agreement amounts to a partnership. There, in an agreement 
for the development of real estate, the parties called 
themselves "joint venturers". Mason, Brennan, and Deane JJ 
in their joint judgment found that the relationship 
exhibited all the indicia of a partnership: it was a common 
enterprise with a view to a profit, profits were to be 
shared, the joint venture property was held on trust, the 
participants indemnified the managing participant against 
losses, and the policy of the enterprise was a matter for 
joint decision. On this basis it was found that the parties 
were in law partners. 
36 In Commerce Commission v Fletcher Challenge , McGechan J 
f 11 d th . b d h d ·d 37 o owe is roa approac an sa1 : 
In the end the matter is one of substance and intention. 
The Court will look at the substance which is agreed. If 
the indicia of a partnership are present, the arrangement 
may well be categorised as a partnership despite some 
contrary label. 
38 Applying this approach to the facts, McGechan J concluded: 
35 
36 
37 
38 
Above 
Above 
Above 
Above 
nl7, 679. 
n22. 
n22, 616. 
n22, 618. 
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It was an association of the pair in a venture for mutual 
profit. It is within the Commission plea of "partnership or 
joint venture". Quite which does not matter, in view of the 
dual wording of the plea, but for any importance it may have 
I incline to the alternative of "joint venture". There is 
an "exclusion of implied relationships" clause in the draft 
agreement ••• specifically excluding partnership or agency . 
.•• While not in law conclusive, its existence plus the 
resources exploitation nature of the activity make a joint 
venture categorisation more attractive. 
To conclude, in deciding whether or not a particular 
relationship is a partnership, the starting point is the 
Partnership Act 1908. However, focussing on elements of the 
statutory definition of partnership as separa~e requirements 
. th d t'f' ' 1 ' 39 h t ' 1s a ra er narrow an ar 1 1c1a exercise. Te Ac 1s 
not a code, and the courts have taken a broader approach to 
the question whether a particular joint venture relationship 
is a partnership. 
c The Mining or Petroleum Joint Venture 
An example of a joint venture agreement which probably does 
not create a partnership is the typical mining or petroleum 
joint venture agreement. It is likely that one or more of 
the indicia of a partnership will not be present in such 
agreements. 
In Australia and Canada especially, the joint venture has 
become a common business vehicle in the mining and petroleum 
industries. Modern mining and petroleum projects bring 
together capital and talent on a large scale. Economic 
factors such as high capital costs, the need for economies 
of scale, and the need to spread investment risk by 
diversification have become influential in the industry. 
Traditional forms of business organisation are not suited to 
such projects. The need to develop a new form of business 
organisation was met by drafters, often using complex 
39 KM Hayne "The Need for a Joint Venture Code?" [1990] AMPLA 
Yearbook 362, 365. 
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contractual documents. Thus the mining or petroleum joint 
venture evolved and now assumes a "character of its own 11 • 40 
Mining and petroleum joint ventures possess certain typical 
characteristics. Persons or companies wishing to achieve a 
common goal enter into the relationship, which is defined in 
an often lengthy contractual document. The scope of the 
relationship is usually limited to the purpose to be 
achieved and/or the duration of the agreement. The 
relationship is usually unincorporated. 
The terms of the agreement typically provide for the 
appointment of an "operator" or "manager" who manages the 
day to day running of the project, usually one of the 
parties themselves. The operator is severally appointed and 
acts as the parties' agent for specified purposes. An 
operating committee comprising of representatives of the 
parties makes policy decisions and gives instructions to the 
operator. The property of the joint venture is usually held 
by the venturers as tenants in common in specific 
proportions (coupled with an agreement by the parties not to 
exercise their right to partition). The parties are 
severally liable for debts only to the extent of their 
proportionate interest in the joint venture. Each joint 
venturer is entitled to a separate share of the product in 
accordance with its proportionate interest, the joint 
venture then terminates and each party deals with the 
product separately. 
Advantages of this type of business association are 
manifold. Perhaps the main contributing factor to the 
popularity of the joint venture are the significant tax 
41 advantages. Other advantages are: the joint venturers 
40 J D Merralls above n2, 2. 
41 G L J Ryan above n3, 127; A J Black "Joint Ventures, Partnerships 
and Fiduciary duties: United Dominions Corporation Ltd v Brian Pty Ltd" 
(1986) 15 Melbourne Uni LR 708, 709; RA Ladbury "Mining Joint Ventures" 
(1984) Australian Business Law Review 312, 316. 
• 11, 
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have limited liability to third parties; a joint venturer 
cannot bind its colleagues; each joint venturer can adopt 
its own accounting treatment of its interest in the joint 
venture; and each joint venturer can arrange its own 
financing and give security over its separate interest. 
The above anticipated advantages assume that this type of 
joint venture is not a partnership, and drafters and members 
of the industry proceed on this basis. Australian 
commentators have suggested that the courts would be more 
willing to hold that this typical mining or petroleum joint 
venture is an entity quite distinct from a partnership and 
that partnership principles will not be applied to this kind 
f . . t 42 o Joint ven ure. 
Some Australian commentators say that typical mining and 
petroleum joint ventures are not partnerships because the 
business is not carried on "in common", but rather 
43 severally. 
or petroleum 
venturers as 
The argument concedes that in typical mining 
joint venture, the property is held by the 
tenants in common, the venturers contribute to 
common expenses, and there is common decision making through 
the operating committee. Nevertheless the business is not 
being carried on "in common" because the venturers are 
severally and separately liable to third parties; each 
venturer separately and severally appoints the operator as 
its agent; the venturers receive their share of the product 
and sell it separately making a separate profit; there is 
separate accounting and tax treatment; and there are no 
common activities. 
44 It is suggested that the existence of mutual agency in the 
joint venture agreement will have an important bearing on 
42 G L J Ryan above n3, 123; RA Ladbury "Commentary" in Finn PD (ed) 
Essays in Equity (The Law Book Company, Australia 1985) 37, 38. 
43 RA Ladbury above n42, 41; KM Hayne above n39, 367. 
44 Whether a relationship of agency exists will depend not on the 
terminology employed by the parties to describe their relationship but 
• 
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the question whether the business is being carried on "in 
common". If the parties clearly are not agents for each 
other then the arrangement will probably not be a 
partnership on the basis that the business is not being 
carried out "in common 11 •
45 
Even if joint venturers in the mining and petroleum 
industries can be said to be "carrying on a business in 
common", they are not carrying it out "with a view of 
profit". This is the most common basis advanced by 
Australian commentators for distinguishing a mining or 
t 1 · · t , 46 pe ro eum Join venture from a partnership. 
In the typical mining or petroleum joint venture, each 
venturer receives a share of the product of the venture: oil 
or gas if it is a venture to work a mine or well or a share 
in the prospecting discovery if it is an exploration 
venture. Each individual venturer may sell this share of 
the product or process it further before sale. 
The argument assumes that "with a view of profit" means with 
a view of joint profit, and that profit made by each 
individual venturer after having received the share of the 
product, is not joint profit. 
The further assumption is made that the receipt of a share 
of the product is not equivalent to sharing in the "profit" 
of the joint venture. Section 5 of the Partnership Act 1908 
gives assistance in the interpretation of the word "profit" 
here. For the purposes of determining whether a 
on the true nature of the agreement: Halsbury's Laws of England above 
n3, Vol 1(2) para 1, p4. 
45 Lang v James Morrison & Co Ltd (1911) 13 CLR 1, 11 cited in R L 
Pritchard ''Unincorporated Joint Ventures" in R Vann and RP Austin (ed) 
The Law of Public Company Finance (The Law Book Company, New South 
Wales, Australia, 1986) 494, 502. 
46 UDC v Brian above n17, 681 per Dawson J; G L J Ryan above n3, 137-
142; J D Merralls "Mining and Petroleum Joint Ventures in Australia: 
Some Basic Legal Concepts" (1988) 62 ALJ 907, 909; Ladbury above n42, 
40. 
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relationship is a partnership, section 5 makes a distinction 
between the sharing of profits in subsection 5(1) (c), and 
the sharing of gross returns in subsection 5 (1) (b). This 
suggests that "profit" means the net gain resulting after 
payment of all outgoings. Therefore "profit" in section 4 
does not mean simply the product of the joint venture. 
Cases commonly cited in support of this argument include the 
English cases of Hoare v Dawes 47 , Coope v Eyre48 , and Gibson 
49 v Lupton . In those cases "joint adventures" were held not 
to be partnerships because what the parties intended to 
divide between themselves was the goods purchased, rather 
than the profits from resale. 50 
The following discussion is concerned with those joint 
venture agreements which do not create partnerships. The 
term "joint venture" will only be used in this narrower 
sense as something which is not a partnership. 
IV NON-PARTNERSHIP JOINT VENTURES: THE NATURE OF THE 
FIDUCIARY OBLIGATION 
Fiduciary law has been developed by Courts of Equity with 
the policy objective of maintaining the integrity of 
relationships which are regarded by society as requiring a 
high degree of commitment. It achieves this objective by 
placing an intense standard of conduct on the "fiduciary", 
which is rigourously exacted, and for which breach is 
remedied flexibly by the availability of both personal and 
proprietary remedies. 
47 (1780) 1 Doug 371. 
48 (1788) 1 H Bl 37. 
49 (1832) 9 Bing 291. 
50 R C I Banks above n31, para 5-13, p65. 
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A The Standard of Conduct 
Once a person has been designated as a fiduciary, Equity's 
most intense standard of conduct is imposed. The 
distinctive feature of this standard is the absolute 
prohibition of self-interested behaviour. This is a severe 
restriction on the fiduciary's freedom. "Fiduciary" is 
essentially a descriptive term for all relationships where 
the law totally proscribes self-interested conduct and 
imposes on one party to the relationship a duty to act with 
the utmost loyalty in the interests of the other party (or 
in the joint interest in the case of a partnership or joint 
51 52 venture ) . 
However New Zealand courts have in the past confused the 
fiduciary standard of conduct with the less suingent "good 
faith" standard of conduct. 53 The good faith standard 
allows a party to act self-interestedly but in doing so to 
have regard to the interests of the other party. Its main 
ground is contract law and it is often called the duty of 
"fair dealing". The person is required to weigh up 
conflicting interests rather than to act with undivided 
loyalty in the interests of the other party or in the joint 
interest. 54 This confusion of the two standards occurs 
when the Court desires to impose a proprietary remedy, and 
the use of the "fiduciary" label is perceived as necessary 
51 PD Finn "Contract and the Fiduciary Principle" (1989) 12 UNSWLJ 
76, 83. 
52 PD Finn "The Fiduciary Principle" in T G Youdan (ed) Equity, 
Fiduciaries and Trusts (The Carswell Company, Ontario, Canada, 1989), 
27; LS Sealy "Some Principles of Fiduciary Obligations " [1963] 
Cambridge Law Journal 119; D WM Waters The Law of Trusts in Canada (2 
ed, The Carswell Company Ltd, Toronto, Canada, 1984) 32. 
53 Petrocorp Exploration Ltd v Minister of Energy [1991) 1 NZLR 1, 36 
per Cooke P using the term fiduciary in an "elastic" sense as a duty of 
"good faith and reasonable cooperation"; Kiwi Gold No Liability v 
Prophecy Mining No Liability, Unreported 18 July 1991, Court of Appeal, 
CA 30/91; Offshore Mining Company Ltd v The Attorney General, 
Unreported 28 April 1988, Court of Appeal, CA 116/86; Marr v Arabco 
above n19, 102 745. 
54 PD Finn "The Fiduciary Principle" above n52, 4. 
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in order to achieve this end. But this reasoning is 
fallacious, and there is a danger that the fiduciary 
standard will losing its distinctive quality. 
B Method of Exacting the Standard 
Not only is a rigourous standard of conduct placed on a 
fiduciary; but the method which the Courts of Equity have 
developed to exact this standard is draconian. To ensure 
adherence, the fiduciary is prohibited from placing himself 
in a position where the opportunity exists to prefer his 
interest over the beneficiary•s55 interest. In this way all 
temptation is removed. The fiduciary is deterred from even 
contemplating making a profit from his position. It is 
irrelevant to liability whether the fiduciary actually acted 
dishonestly. 
On this note Finn has said that two overlapping 
proscriptions are imposed on the fiduciary: 56 
A fiduciary -
{l) cannot use his/her position to his/her own or to a third 
party's possible advantage or to the beneficiary's possible 
disadvantage (this is called misusing his/her position) or; 
(2) cannot, in any matter within the scope of his/her 
service, have a personal interest or an inconsistent 
engagement with a third party (this is called conflict of 
duty and interest57 and conflict of duty and duty 
respectively) 
unless this is freely consented to by the beneficiary or 
authorised by law. 
The above overlapping proscriptions state the obligation of 
the fiduciary in the most general terms. The Courts have 
55 "Beneficiary" is used in the broader sense as the person in the 
relationship who is owed fiduciary duties. 
56 PD Finn ''The Fiduciary Principle" above n52. 
57 Bray v Ford (1896] AC 44, 51 per Lord Herschell. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
- 17 -
/ 
d 1 d b f 'f' d t' 58 eve ope a num er o more speci 1c u ies. 
fiduciary duties do not apply uniformly to all 
relationships. Rather, the nature and scope 
application depends upon the circumstances. 59 
The 
types of 
of their 
This strict method of exacting the fiduciary standard can be 
illustrated by the case of Keech v Sandford60 . There a 
trustee used his position to obtain a leasehold after the 
lessor had failed to allow the beneficiary to renew. It was 
not proven that the trustee was disloyal and no loss was 
suffered by the beneficiary. But because the possibility 
existed that the trustee had been disloyal, the trustee was 
held liable for breach of fiduciary duty. 
There are two justifications for this rule which proscribes 
possible conflict as well as actual conflict of interest and 
duty. First there is the prophylactic justification - the 
fiduciary is strongly deterred from breaching his/her 
fiduciary duty. Secondly there is an evidential 
justification. If the beneficiary was required to prove 
actual disloyalty (tha~ is, that the fiduciary was swayed by 
his own interests rather than acting in the sole interests 
of the beneficiary); 
would be too strict. 
then in many cases the burden of proof 
Often the fiduciary holds all the 
necessary information. Therefore the rule is that, when the 
possibility existed that the fiduciary could have acted 
other than for the best interests of the beneficiary, then 
the beneficiary is not required to prove actual disloyalty; 
it is presumed . 
58 Finn has identified eight specific fiduciary duties: PD Finn 
Fiduciary Obligations (The Law Book Company Ltd, Sydney, 1977). 
59 NZ Netherlands Society 'Oranje' Inc v Kuys and the Windmill Post 
Ltd [1973] 2 NZLR 163, 166 per Lord Wilberforce; Birtchnell v Equity 
Trustees (1929) 42 CLR 384, 408 per Dixon J. 
60 (1726) Cas temp King 61. 
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It has been suggested61 that the above presumption that the 
fiduciary acted dishonestly is not an irrebuttable 
presumption. Where it is proven that the fiduciary acted 
with utmost loyalty, then the fiduciary should not be held 
liable for breach of duty. In other words, to hold a 
fiduciary liable for breach of duty there must be a ''real 
sensible possibility1162 that the fiduciary acted for his own 
selfish interests, and not merely an hypothetical 
possibility. 
. h. 63 However in P 1pps v Boardman the trustees purchased 
shares in a private company purely in order to gain control 
of it so that they could make it a profitable investment for 
the beneficiaries (who themselves held a share interest in 
the company). The deal was profitable to the beneficiaries 
as well as to the trustees personally. It was proven that 
the trustees acted with the utmost honesty and loyalty in 
the sole interests of the beneficiaries. Yet the majority 
in the House of Lords held that the trustees were liable to 
account for their profit. 
This decision should not be followed. A fiduciary who can 
be shown to have acted loyally and in the interests of the 
beneficiary should not be held liable for breach of 
fiduciary duty, even if a profit was made. If Equity's 
method of exacting the fiduciary standard of conduct was 
relaxed in this way, there would be no dire consequences for 
the evidence justification which favours prima facie strict 
liability, because the onus would be on the fiduciary to 
show loyalty. As for the deterrence justification, it is 
questionable whether it is necessary to make an example of a 
61 G Jones "Unjust Enrichment and the Fiduciary's Duty of Loyalty" 
(1968) 84 LQR 472, 478. 
62 Phipps v Boardman (1967] 2 AC 46,124 per Lord Upjohn (dissenting). 
63 Above n62. 
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/ 
fiduciary whose integrity has been proven, in order to deter 
others. 64 
C Remedies Available for Breach of the Fiduciary Standard 
Remedies available for breach of a fiduciary duty are 
traditionally aimed at requiring the fiduciary to disgorge 
any gain made. In Aquaculture Corporation v New Zealand 
Green Mussel Co Ltd65 the Court of Appeal emphasised that, 
following the merging of law and equity, the full range of 
remedies whether originating in common law or in equity are 
available for breach of an equitable duty. 66 The 
restitutionary measure will be important when the 
beneficiary has suffered no loss. Following this decision 
the plaintiff can alternatively opt for the compensatory 
67 measure and perhaps even for exemplary damages. 
Both proprietary and personal remedies will be available. 
The personal remedies include requiring the defendant 
fiduciary to account in equity or to pay equitable damages. 
Proprietary remedies include the equitable lien and the 
constructive trust. These proprietary remedies are 
significant because they enable the beneficiary to pursue 
the specific property into the hands of third parties; and 
can give the plaintiff-beneficiary priority over unsecured 
creditors of the defendant where the defendant is insolvent. 
The identification of persons who are subject to these 
unrelenting fiduciary rules becomes a vital concern. But 
64 Perhaps this question of whether it is necessary to make an example 
of an honest fiduciary can only be answered by considering the facts of 
any particular case: G Jones above n61, 502. 
65 [1990] 3 NZLR 299. 
66 Above n65, 301 per Cooke P. 
67 The Court of Appeal declined to award exemplary damages in an 
action for breach of confidence because the award of compensatory 
damages in the particular case sufficiently punished the defendant. 
However it was suggested that exemplary damages may be awarded in other 
cases for breach of confidence: above n65, 302 per Cooke P. 
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first, since joint ventures are essentially contractual, it 
is necessary to consider the special problems that arise 
where fiduciary principles are imposed upon parties who are 
negotiating towards or who have concluded a contract. 
V CONTRACT LAW AND THE FIDUCIARY OBLIGATION 
Contract law is primarily concerned with fulfilling the 
expectations of the parties. Classical contract theory 
favours principles of individualism and freedom of contract 
to achieve this end. 
The fiduciary obligation is a potential inroad on contract 
law. First, a liability issue arises: to what extent can 
fiduciary law create rights and obligations where contract 
law does not? Secondly, there is an issue in respect of 
remedy: in what circumstances can fiduciary law apply to 
give remedies beyond those available for breach of contract? 
A Liability 
The fiduciary standard of conduct, both when it is imposed 
on parties negotiating towards a contract and when it is 
imposed on parties who have already executed the contract, 
can give the parties rights and obligations not available at 
contract law. 
1 Parties negotiating towards a contract 
Classical contract theory takes the view that neither party 
owes any duties to the other party before the contract is 
made. 68 It is assumed that at the negotiations stage the 
parties will have equal legal freedom to bargain in their 
own self interest, and in this way will reach true consensus 
without the law's interference. Fiduciary law, by imposing 
68 PS Atiyah An Introduction to the Law of Contract (4ed, Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 1989), 108. 
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an obligation on the fiduciary to protect the beneficiaries' 
interests, limits one party's freedom to unreservedly 
pursue his/her own self-interest when negotiating towards a 
contract. 69 
Yet fiduciary duties can probably be imposed on parties 
t . t . t d t ' 7 O ' t h ld nego ia ing owar s a con ract. In UDC v Brian i was e 
that the parties had eventually concluded a partnership 
agreement. But the alleged breach of fiduciary duty 
occurred before the partnership agreement was fully 
formalised. It was held that fiduciary duties existed at 
that time. Mason, Brennan and Deane JJ said in their joint 
judgrnent: 71 "A fiduciary relationship can arise and 
fiduciary duties can exist between parties who have not 
reached, and who may never reach, agreement upon the 
consensual terms which are to govern the arrangement between 
them." The New Zealand High Court has given support to 
th . . t. 72 is proposi ion. 
The position is more controversial where parties are 
negotiating for a contract which is never concluded. In 
Fraser Edmiston Pty Ltd v AGT (Qld) Pty Ltd73 the parties 
were negotiating towards a partnership but they never 
formalised their relationship. Relying heavily on UDC v 
Brian74 , it was held that fiduciary duties were nevertheless 
owed. 
69 Duties of "good faith", which allow the pursuit of one"s individual 
interests but curtailed by the maintenance of reasonable community 
standards, are another potential inroad to these principles of classical 
contract law. See RE Hawkins "LAC and the Emerging Obligation to 
Bargain in Good Faith" 14 (1990) Queens Law Journal 65. 
70 Above n17. 
71 Above n17, 680. 
72 Marr v Arabco above n19, 102 745; North City Corporation Ltd v 
Tower Corporation Unreported, 9 May 1991, High Court Auckland Registry 
Commercial List CP47/89, Chilwell J; Van Dijk v McCracken above n29; 
Gallagher v Schulz (Nol) Unreported, 1 June 1988, High Court 
Christchurch Registry, A 323/83, Williamson J. 
73 [1988] 2 Qd R 1. 
74 Above n17. 
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In LAC Minerals Ltd v International Corona Resources Ltd75 
the Supreme Court of Canada debated the question whether a 
fiduciary relationship can exist between parties negotiating 
toward a partnership or joint venture where no agreement is 
ever concluded. Sopinka J said: 76 "The parties had not 
advanced beyond the mere negotiation stage. Indeed, they 
had not as yet defined what precisely their relationship 
would be." On this basis the facts were distinguishable 
from those in UDC v Brian where, at the time the fiduciary 
duties were imposed, " ... the arrangements between the 
prospective joint venturers had passed far beyond the stage 
f t , t. 77 . . o mere nego ia ion." It was left open whether fiduciary 
duties might be imposed in other cases where negotiating 
parties did not conclude a formal agreement. 
2 Parties to a concluded contract 
Fiduciary duties more often arise upon parties to a 
concluded contract. 78 This is also controversial. The 
principle of freedom of contract states that the parties 
should be able to define and limit their obligations by the 
terms of their contract. 79 The law should not intervene by 
imposing further obligations, for example burdensome 
fiduciary ones. This is especially so where the contract 
comprehensively sets out the parties' rights and obligations 
so that every contingency is dealt with, as is often the 
case with joint venture contracts. 
75 
76 
77 
(1989) 61 DLR (4th), 14. 
Above n75, 65. 
Above n17, 680. 
78 Daly v The Sydney Stock Exchange (1986) 60 ALJR 371 (broker-client 
agreement); Chan v Zacharia above n27 (partnership agreement); Moorgate 
Tobacco Co Ltd v Philip Morris Ltd/No 2) (1984) 156 CLR 414 (licensor-
licensee agreement); Standard Investments Ltd v CIBC (1985) 22 DLR (4th) 
410 (bank-corporate customer agreement); Lloyds Bank Ltd v Bundy [1974) 
All ER 757 (bank-customer agreement). 
79 J F Burrows, J W Finn, S Todd Cheshire and Fifoot's Law of Contract 
(7ed, Butterworths, New Zealand, 1988) 14. 
II 
I 
I 
I 
(I 
I 
- 23 -
In Offshore Mining Company Ltd v The Attorney Generalao 
these contract principles were emphasised. The case 
involved a contract for the supply of gas, made between the 
Crown (as seller) and a group of joint venturers (the 
buyers). Arguments made by the joint venturers included 
that the Crown had acted in breach of an implied term or 
alternatively had breached a fiduciary duty. On the basis 
that negotiations had been lengthy and the parties had 
covered all aspects of the transaction in exhaustive detail, 
it was held that the express contract alone governed the 
parties' relationship.al Cooke P said:a 2 " ... the content of 
any general duties to the other contracting party has to be 
determined in the light of the scheme and express provisions 
of the contract." (Emphasis added). 
In Petrocorp v Minister of Energya 3 in the context of a 
joint venture contractual relationship, Cooke P expressed a 
willingness to find duties over and above those in the 
contract where the provisions in the contract are ambiguous. 
The Minister of Energy and the plaintiff oil companies were 
the parties to a joint venture operating agreement signed in 
1986. The joint venture was engaged in prospecting for and 
mining petroleum in Taranaki. Upon discovery of a 
significant reservoir of crude oil, the joint venturers 
applied for an extension of their license from the Minister 
of Energy. The Minister, on behalf of the Crown, declined 
the application and granted himself a mining license. One 
of the plaintiffs' arguments was that the Minister 
contravened fiduciary responsibilities owed to the other 
joint venturers, by misusing information which came to him, 
among other reasons, as a member of the joint venture. 
80 Above n53. 
81 Offshore Mining above n53, 
J Offshore Mining Unreported, 
Registry A466/83,57-58. 
82 Above n53. 
83 Above n53 . 
Bisson J upholding the comments of Grieg 
2 May 1986, High Court Wellington 
LAW LIBRARY 
VICTORI A UN!VEHSITY OF V.'ELLINGTOII 
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In the Court of Appeal it was held that the Minister owed 
obligations to the other joint venturers and that these 
obligations were expressly and unambiguously set out in the 
contract so that fiduciary law did not need to be resorted 
to. 84 Cooke P said: 85 
•.. it is unnecessary to resort to doctrines of fiduciary 
duty or implied term where the express provisions of the 
contract cover the matter. Nor do I think that there is any 
relevant ambiguity in the section or the agreement when each 
is fairly interpreted. If there were any relevant 
ambiguity, I would lean towards an interpretation to the 
effect the Minister, in acting for commercial purposes owed 
a duty of loyalty and consideration to his fellow joint 
venturers, which might be described by the somewhat elastic 
term fiduciary duty . 
The doctrine of the implied term has been developed by 
contract law as an extension of the courts' function of 
finding out what the parties have agreed upon. such implied 
terms can have fiduciary content. But the rules for implying 
terms into the contract have been developed closely around 
the concern of fulfilling the parties' expectations. A term 
can be implied only if it is necessary to give business 
efficacy to the contract or if it is something so obvious 
't . h . 86 that i goes wit out saying. 
Unlike implied duties, fiduciary duties are not solely 
premised on the fulfilment of the parties' expectations. 
Traditionally other considerations such as policy ones have 
been relevant. 87 In this way the court is given more 
discretion and is not limited by strict rules like those for 
implying a terms into a contract. Fiduciary duties are 
therefore said to be "imposed" by the courts rather than 
84 This decision was overturned by the Privy Council where it was held 
that the Crown's contractual obligations could not take effect so as to 
fetter the Minister's discretion to exercise his licensing powers under 
the Petroleum Act 1937: Petrocorp Exploration Ltd v Minister of Energy 
(1991) 1 NZLR 641. 
85 Above n53, 36. 
86 J F Burrows, J W Finn & S Todd above n79, 149-155. 
87 E J Weinrib "The Fiduciary Obligation" (1975) 25 UTLJ 1, 15. 
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"implied". It follows that fiduciary law can create 
liability where neither the express terms of the contract 
nor any implied terms are breached. This possibility 
conflicts with principles of contract theory. 88 
The conflict of principle is not quite so prominent where 
the very reason the parties entered into the contract was to 
secure the paramountcy of one parties' interests; for 
example in agency contracts, or bailment contracts. In 
those cases there will be no question of the law 
contradicting the expectations of the parties by imposing a 
fiduciary duty to act with selfless loyalty in the 
beneficiaries' interests. Even on the narrow test of 
implying a term into the contract, duties with a fiduciary 
content would be held to exist. The conflict becomes acute 
where the contract was entered into to serve the joint 
interests of the parties, 89 or (even more controversially) 
their several interests. In such cases something more will 
be required before the Courts will impose fiduciary 
90 obligations over and above the contractual ones. 
B Remedy 
Upon breach of contract only the traditional contractual 
remedies are available. These are essentially in personam 
and compensatory. Remedies unleashed by the fiduciary 
doctrine can be restitutionary and in rem. Proprietary 
remedies are an inroad into the doctrine of privity of 
contract because they can have an effect on third parties. 
88 Recent New Zealand High Court decisions which discourage the 
imposition of fiduciary duties beyond those duties express and implied 
in the contract include: Plateau Equipment Ltd v Marsden Unreported, 28 
February 1991, High Court Rotorua Registry CP 8/91, Doogue J; Cable 
Price Corporation Ltd v McFaddyn, Unreported, 8 March 1991, High Court 
Christchurch Registry CP 37/91, Holland J. 
89 For example licensing agreements, franchises, distributorships. 
90 PD Finn above n52, 31. 
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VI THE COMMERCIAL/DOMESTIC DISTINCTION 
A distinction is often made between commercial and domestic 
1 t . h' 91 th . . . re a ions ips. In e commercial world, certainty is 
vital. Businesspersons making decisions must be able to 
predict accurately the conduct which they will be held 
liable for, and more importantly, the remedial consequences 
of liability. The principle of fulfilling the parties' 
expectations, which contract law protects, is even more 
necessary in commercial relationships. For fear of 
upsetting business expectations, the Courts are even more 
reluctant to impose fiduciary obligations on parties 
negotiating towards or who have concluded a commercial 
contract. But it is suggested that the Courts are often 
blinded by this ultimate consideration and neglect to reason 
in a logical, step by step manner. 
Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corporation 
and Others92 involved a manufacturer and distributor 
relationship. The High Court of Australia rejected 
completely any suggestion that a fiduciary element existed 
in the relationship. Gibbs CJ, Wilson and Dawson JJ placed 
much importance on the fact that the distributorship 
93 contract was essentially a commercial arrangement. Gibbs 
'd 94 CJ sai : 
... the fact that the arrangement between the parties was of 
a purely commercial kind and that they had dealt at arm's 
length and on an equal footing has consistently been 
regarded by this court as important, if not decisive, in 
indicating that no fiduciary duty arose ... 
The phrases "commercial" relationship, "arms length", "on an 
equal footing" are misleading. These phrases have no 
91 The distinction is not a new one: NZ & Australian Land Co v Watson 
[1881) 7 QBD 374, 382 per Bramwell J. 
92 ALR 55 (1984) 417. 
93 Above n92, 433, 435 per Gibbs CJ, 470-471 per Wilson J, 491-492 
per Dawson J. 
94 Above n92, 433. 
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content; they beg the question of whether the parties stood 
in some special equitable relationship, since they do no 
more than state a negative conclusion.
95 The challenge for 
the courts is to develop criteria for determining whether 
the parties were in a "commercial" relationship, at "arms 
length", and on an "equal footing"; or whether the parties 
in fact stood in some special equitable relationship, for 
example a fiduciary one. It is because commercial 
transactions do not as a matter of fact satisfy the 
criteria, not because they are "commercial", that they do 
not usually carry with them fiduciary duties.
96 
This reluctance of the courts to impose fiduciary duties on 
parties in the commercial setting seems to stem primarily 
from the understanding that a finding of fiduciary liability 
will unleash proprietary remedies which can have far-
reaching consequences beyond the immediate parties. But 
once it has been found that the parties are in some special 
equitable relationship, for example a fiduciary one, 
proprietary consequences do not necessarily follow. The 
courts have discretion as to remedy. It will be relevant to 
the question of remedy to inquire further into the specific 
commercial consequences of giving an in rem remedy. It is 
suggested that in the interests of certainty the courts need 
to develop specific guide-lines as to exactly when 
proprietary remedies are appropriate.
97 Only then will the 
courts stop reasoning that no fiduciary relationship existed 
simply on the basis that phrases "arms length" and 
"commercial transaction" seemed appropriate. 
95 RP Austin "Commerce and Equity - Fiduciary Duty and Constructive 
Trust" (1986) 6 OJLS 444, 454. 
96 J RF Lehane "Fiduciaries in a Commercial Context" in PD Finn (ed) 
Essays in Equity above n 41,104. 
97 The Hon Sir Anthony Mason "Themes and Prospects" in PD Finn (ed) 
Essays in Equity (The Law Book Company, Australia 1985) 242, 246. 
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II DO FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS EXIST BETWEEN PARTIES TO A 
JOINT VENTURE? 
A Selecting the Analytical Approach 
There are two analytical approaches to the question whether 
fiduciary duties exist between parties to a voluntary or 
consensual relationship. First, there is the approach of 
categorising the relationship in question as one to which 
fiduciary duties presumptively attach. Secondly there is 
the approach of focussing on the circumstances of the case. 
The appropriate approach for deciding whether fiduciary 
obligations should be imposed upon parties to a joint 
venturers agreement will now be considered. 
Traditionally, Courts of Chancery found it necessary to 
categorise the legal relationship between the parties in 
order to determine whether fiduciary duties were owed. The 
rigid duty of loyalty owed by trustee to beneficiary could 
only be extended if the category of relationship which the 
claimant was in, was sufficiently analogous to the trustee-
b f . . 1 . . 
98 . b f ene iciary re ationship. In this way the num er o 
categories of relationship for which fiduciary duties and 
remedies were available grew. 
Today the list of recognised categories includes in addition 
to the trustee-beneficiary relationship: the solicitor-
client relationship, the doctor-patient relationship, the 
agent-principal relationship, the director's relationship to 
his/her company, and the relationship between partners. The 
99 
categories are not closed , and so it is open to the courts 
to recognise a new category. 
By recognising a new category the courts in effect make 
generalisations about the usual incidents of a relationship 
and conclude that, just like the usual incidents of the 
98 D WM Waters above n52, 405. 
99 Guerin v The Queen (1984) 2 SCR 335, 384. 
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trustee-beneficiary relationship, those incidents warrant 
the imposition of the fiduciary standard of conduct.
100 
But even for traditionally recognised categories of 
relationship, there may be exceptional cases where fiduciary 
bl . t. 
. 101 . . h 
o iga ions have been negatived. This will occur w en 
the usual incidents of that category of relationship are not 
present on the facts of the particular case. Therefore, it 
can be said there is a presumption that fiduciary 
obligations exist for the recognised categories of 
relationships, and that this presumption can be rebutted. 
In America, although there is some confusion in this area, 
the joint venture is probably a recognised category of 
relationship from which fiduciary duties presumptively flow. 
The leading American authority is Meinhard v Salmon
102 
where Cardozo J said:
103 "Joint adventurers, like co-
partners, owe to one another, while the enterprise 
continues, the duty of finest loyalty." 
In Australia the point was decided in UDC v Brian.
104 The 
Supreme Court of New South Wales (Court of Appeal 
Division)
105 found that joint venturers owe to each other 
fiduciary duties. Samuels JA adopted Cardozo J's statements 
in Meinhard v Salmon and extended the duties owed between 
partners to joint venturers. Hutley JA, also on the basis 
of analogy with the partnership, held that the very nature 
of the joint venture relationship renders it fiduciary. 
100 PD Finn above n 51, 89. 
101 JC Shepherd The Law of Fiduciaries (The Carswell Company Ltd, 
Toronto, Canada, 1981) 21-22; J R Gautreau "Demystifying the Fiduciary 
Mystique" 68 Can Bar Rev 1, 8. 
102 (1928) 164 NE 545. 
103 Above n102, 546. 
104 Above n17. 
105 (1983] 1 NSWLR 490. 
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In the High Court this approach was rejected; Mason, Brennan 
d 'd 106 an Deane JJ sai : 
One would need a more confined and precise notion of what 
constitutes a "joint venture" than that which the term bears 
as a matter of ordinary language before it could be said by 
way of general proposition that the relationship between 
joint venturers is necessarily a fiduciary one ... The most 
that can be said is that whether or not the relationship 
between joint venturers is fiduciary will depend upon the 
form which the particular joint venture takes and upon the 
content of the obligations which the parties to it have 
undertaken. 
Similarly, in New Zealand the joint venture is probably not 
a category of relationship to which fiduciary obligations 
t . 1 attach. 107 presump ive y 
The recent Court of Appeal decision Kiwi Gold NL v Prophecy 
. . 108 . 1 d . . . h Mining NL invo ve an exploration Joint venture. Te 
parties to the joint venture agreement were Mr Atkinson (who 
later purported to assign his interest to Prophecy Mining), 
and Kiwi Gold Exploration Co Ltd (who later assigned its 
interest to Kiwi Gold No Liability). Mr Atkinson 
contributed the necessary licence to the joint venture, and 
Kiwi Gold was to provide the finance. It was a term of the 
contract that, pursuant to a work programme and budget which 
was to be prepared by Mr Atkinson and approved by Kiwi Gold, 
Kiwi Gold would contribute $70,000 towards exploration 
expenditure in the first year of the joint venture. Because 
the work programmes and budgets prepared by Mr Atkinson far 
exceeded the anticipated expenditure levels, they were not 
approved by Kiwi Gold. In the result, Kiwi Gold failed to 
contribute the $70,000 within the year. Prophecy Mining 
brought an action to recover this amount. 
106 Above n17, 679. 
107 Kiwi Gold No Liability v Prophecy Mining No Liability above n53; 
Offshore Mining Co Ltd v The Attorney General above n53 per Bisson J; 
Marr v Arabco above n19, 102 747. 
108 Above n53. 
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One of the grounds for the claim was that Kiwi Gold owed a 
fiduciary duty to Prophecy Mining, to work towards a 
position where the $70,000 could be contributed within the 
first year. Thomas J at trial held that a fiduciary 
obligation arose in its own right as a result of the 
relationship of joint venture partners, and that this 
fiduciary duty had been breached. Casey J, McGechan J and 
McKay J reversed that decision on appeal. McKay J giving 
the judgment of the Court said: 109 
We do not regard the relationship between the parties in the 
present case as being sufficient of itself to establish 
fiduciary obligations, but we agree with Thomas J that 
similar duties to act reasonably and in good faith can be 
implied into the contract itself. (Emphasis added). 
Following this decision it is difficult to argue that in New 
Zealand the joint venture is a category of relationship to 
which fiduciary duties presumptively attach. Unfortunately 
the Court did not address the point directly. It is here 
suggested that the driving reason for the decision was that 
the case was able to be adequately disposed of by implying 
terms into the contract. McKay J found it unnecessary to 
impose fiduciary duties because he was able to imply terms 
into the contract which had a "similar11110 content to any 
fiduciary duties that he would have imposed. It was 
unnecessary to use the fiduciary doctrine to get the 
distinctive proprietary remedy since those duties were never 
breached. The implication of the decision; that is that the 
joint venture relationship itself will not be sufficient to 
establish fiduciary obligations in future cases; was not 
fully considered. 
109 Above n53, 12. 
110 McKay J took the view that duties to act "reasonably and in good 
faith" were "similar" to fiduciary duties. It is submitted that this is 
incorrect, the fiduciary standard is a stricter one: see above Part IV 
A. 
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Nevertheless it is suggested that the decision was correct. 
In New Zealand, as in Australia, the term "joint venture" 
has not been clearly defined - relationships which come 
under the label "joint venture" vary extensively. Therefore 
it is difficult to make generalisations about the 
111 
obligations existing between "joint venturers". Tn many 
cases the joint venturers will have purposely set out not to 
create a partnership for the sole reason that fiduciary 
obligations will not be imposed upon them. In such cases 
fiduciary liability will have the undesired effect of 
contradicting the parties' expectations. 
112 
In addition, there are no strong policy factors which 
justify imposing fiduciary obligations on all joint 
venturers. The social utility of the joint venture 
relationship will not be jeopardised by having some joint 
venture relationships which are not fiduciary. In cases 
where no fiduciary obligations are not imposed, the 
relations between joint venturers will simply be governed by 
the contract between them. 
The more flexible approach is to focus on the circumstances 
in each particular case. This approach reduces the 
possibility that in some cases the joint venturers' 
expectations will be contradicted by the imposition of 
fiduciary duties. The contract and the surrounding 
circumstances are systematically examined. In this way the 
"focus on the circumstances" approach is similar to the 
contractual implied term doctrine.
113 
111 RA Ladbury above n41, 326. 
112 In many cases "(t)o apply to a particular joint venture the 
principles applicable to partnerships may well fix upon the participants 
precisely the liability they had sought to avoid": A J Black above n41, 
736. 
113 The implied term approach differs because, apart from anything 
else, the remedy systems are different: above part V A2. 
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B Focussing on the Circumstances of the Case 
The requisite elements which must be present on the facts 
before fiduciary obligations can be imposed have not been 
clearly identified. Many commentators have attempted to 
d f ' th ' t ' 114 ' 1 11 e 1ne e cr1 eria. As yet no universa, a -purpose 
test has been formulated. It has been questioned whether it 
is desirable to place limits on the fiduciary jurisdiction 
b d t . t 115 . . h d y a op 1ng a est. There is tension between t e nee 
for flexibility on the one hand and the need for certainty 
on the other. 116 It is suggested that certainty is the 
overriding factor considering the wide-ranging effects that 
the fiduciary proprietary remedies (which as yet have no 
guide-lines) have in this area. 
An appropriate test in the context of joint ventures is the 
test of mutual confidence. The test of mutual confidence 
was first put forward in the case of Birtchnell v Equity 
Trustees 117 . That case concerned the relationship between 
t . J . d 118 par ners. Dixon sa1 : 
The relationship between partners is, of course, fiduciary . 
.•• The relation is based, in some degree, upon a mutual 
confidence that the partners will engage in some particular 
kind of activity or transaction for the joint advantage 
only. 
In this way the partnership was recognised as a category of 
relationship to which fiduciary duties presumptively 
attach. 119 
114 E J Weinrib above n87; PD Finn Fiduciary Obligations above n58; J 
C Shepherd "Towards a Unified Concept of Fiduciary Relationships" (1981) 
97 LQR 51; T Frankel "Fiduciary Law" (1983) 71 Calif L Rev 795; J R 
Gautreau above nlOl. 
115 Coleman v Myers (1977] 2 NZLR 225; Hospital Products above n92, 
422-422 per Gibbs CJ, 458-459 per Mason J, 488 per Dawson J. 
116 DR Klinck "The Rise of the 'Remedial' Fiduciary Relationship: A 
Comment on International Corona Resources Ltd v Lac Minerals Ltd" (1987-
1988) 33 McGill LJ 600,624. 
117 Above n59. 
118 Above n59, 407-408. 
119 For confirmation that the partnership is a category of relationship 
to which fiduciary duties attach presumptively see Chan v Zacharia above 
n27. 
• 
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In UDC v Brian120 the Court applied this test of "mutual 
confidence and trust" to the particular circumstances of the 
. . . 121 
case. The maJority said: 
To transpose the words of Dixon Jin Birtchnell (at 407-
408), the participants in each of the then proposed joint 
ventures were "associated for ..• a common end" and the 
relationship between them was "based .•. upon a mutual 
confidence" that they would "engage in (the) 
particular ... activity or transaction for the joint advantage 
only". It matters not, for the present purposes, whether 
that relationship is seen as that which may exist between 
prospective partners or joint venturers before the terms of 
any partnership or joint ventures agreement have been 
settled or whether it is seen as a limited preliminary 
partnership or joint venture to investigate and explore the 
possibilities of an ultimate joint venture or ventures. On 
either approach, it was a fiduciary one. 
In the New Zealand case of Marr v Arabco
122 this test of 
"mutual confidence" was given further support. 
'd 123 sai : 
Tompkins J 
If the course of dealing indicates an intention to carry out 
a common purpose by a joint association in a way that 
involves mutual confidence in each other, fiduciary duties 
may well result. This of course is clearly the case where 
there is a partnership and where there is a joint venture 
agreement other than a partnership. It can also be the case 
where parties are negotiating to achieve either of those 
relationships ... 
The adoption of the test of "mutual confidence" creates much 
needed certainty in this area. But it must be applied 
b . . th th b. . 1 
12 4 b su Jectively ra er an o Jective y. In Marr v Ara co, 
Tompkins J applied the test of mutual confidence too 
subjectively. His subjective approach was been 
't' . d 125 cri icise: 
120 Above n17. 
121 Above n17, 680. 
122 Above n19. 
123 Above n19, 102 744. 
124 Gibbs CJ in Hospital ~~~-~P~r_o_d_u_c_t_s said that the existence of subjective 
trust and confidence can be neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
condition for the finding of a fiduciary duty: above n92, 433. 
125 P L Loughlan "Fiduciary Liability and Constructive Trust: Marr v 
Arabco Traders Ltd" (1989) 7 Otago LR 179, 183. 
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Certainly the prospect of a judicial inquiry into the hearts 
and minds of business associates for the purpose of 
ascertaining the degree to which they trust each other is 
alarming, as is the prospect of the courts explicitly 
recognising an objective test and in fact applying a 
subjective one. 
The test which must be applied is whether a reasonable 
person in the circumstances would have reposed trust and 
confidence in the alleged fiduciary. Outward manifestations 
of the alleged fiduciary's intentions (for example letters 
of intent, heads of agreement, any concluded contractual 
document); together with the surrounding circumstances, must 
all be examined in determining the parties reasonable 
expectations. 
Applying this test to the typical mining or petroleum joint 
venture, it may well be possible to impose fiduciary 
126 
obligations on the operator or manager. It has been 
said that, at least where the operator is acting under 
instructions from the operating committee, the operator is 
the "paradigm of a fiduciary agent 11 •
127 Commonly the 
operator will be an agent for the purposes of making 
contracts with third parties. The operator may hold funds 
and/or property on the joint venturer's behalf. The 
operator is more likely to have access to information and 
technology rights. Such factors will lead joint venturers 
to repose trust and confidence in the operator. 
However in Midcon Oil & Gas v New British Dominion Oil co
128 
the majority in the Supreme Court of Canada found against 
126 RA Ladbury above n41, 328; J D Merralls above n46, 919; D A 
MacWilliam "Fiduciary Relationships in Oil and Gas Joint Ventures" 8 
Alberta LR 233, 234; KM Hayne above n39, 371; EM Bredin "Types of 
Relationships Arising in Oil and Gas Agreements" (1962-1964) 2-3 Alberta 
LR 333, 339-340; PD Finn "Fiduciary Obligations of Coventurers in 
Natural Resources Joint Ventures" [1984] AMPLA Yearbook 106, 162; R 
Dunlop "Oil and Gas Development Contract Interpretation - Fiduciary 
Relation Between Operator and Non-Operator - Duties of Operator" (1960) 
1 Alberta LR 466. 
127 J D Merralls above n46, 920. 
128 [1958] SCR 314. 
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any breach of fiduciary obligation owed by the operator. 
The two parties were joint venturers engaged in a project 
for the exploitation, development and production of 
petroleum and natural gas. The majority found there was 
merely a duty upon the operator to act in good faith within 
the four corners of the agreement. 
The decision has been criticised129 and it has been 
suggested that the dissenting decisions of Rand J and 
Cartwright J will be accepted as law. 130 The minority found 
that, in the particular circumstances of the case, 
131 fiduciary obligations did exist upon the operator: 
The operator, so developing, exploiting and marketing a 
jointly owned produce for a joint benefit has reposed in him 
that reliance and confidence which constitutes a trust 
relationship. 
But there is a difficulty with imposing fiduciary 
obligations upon the operator, or upon any joint venturer 
for that matter. Unlike partners, joint venturers usually 
anticipate that they will each carry on their own separate 
businesses. If these separate businesses are in the same or 
a related field to the joint venture business, then a 
venturer's personal interests may frequently conflict with 
the interests of the joint venture. This is especially 
likely in a small jurisdiction such as New Zealand. 
In view of these practical considerations, it is suggested 
that once it is found that the relationship is fiduciary, 
fiduciary duties to the other joint venturers will apply 
1 t ' 1 132 h 1 f. d . t se ec ive y. Te rue that a 1 uciary must no engage 
129 GR Pellatt "The Fiduciary Duty in Oil and Gas Joint Operating 
Agreements: Midcon Reexamined" (1967-1968) 3 Universtiy of British 
Columbia Law Review 190. 
130 D A MacWilliam above n126, 241; P L Wiese "Commentary on Fiduciary 
Obligations of Operators and Co-Venturers in Natural Resources Joint 
Ventures" [1984) AMPLA Yearbook 189, 194; 
131 Above n126, 329 per Rand J, 
132 The nature and scope of the application of fiduciary duties depends 
on the circumstances of each case. See above Part IV B. 
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in conduct in which it may have a personal interest in 
conflict with those of the other participants will not be 
' b 'dl d 1· t' 133 h 1· t' f th t given un r1 e app 1ca ion. Te app 1ca ion o a 
rule will be limited by the bounds of the joint venture 
134 agreement. In this way a fiduciary will not be liable 
for profit if there has been a conflict between its 
interests and the beneficiary's interests; the fiduciary 
will only be liable if there has been a conflict between its 
interests and the actual undertaking it has made to the 
b f
. . 13 5 ene 1c1ary. 
Further, it is suggested that the rule that a fiduciary 
cannot misuse its position of trust (for example by using 
information and opportunities for its own possible 
advantage) should not apply at all to joint venturers. This 
"misuse" rule has uncertain ambit and the Courts have not 
yet fettered its potentiai. 136 It is suggested that the 
conduct which needs to be prohibited will be adequately 
covered by the "conflict" rule. For example, the use by a 
fiduciary venturer for its own interests of information 
which falls within the scope of the joint venture, will be 
prohibited as a conflict of interest and duty. 
These points were illustrated in the American case of 
' t. h . · 1 d ' 'd · 1 13 7 Br1 is American 01 Pro uc1ng Co v Mi way 01 Co . 
That case involved a detailed contract establishing a joint 
venture to exploit petroleum resources in a designated area. 
It was held that profit made by British American from a 
separate transaction fell outside the subject matter covered 
by fiduciary duties. Therefore no liability arose under the 
conflict rule. Had the duty not to misuse confidential 
133 KM Hayne above n39, 371. 
134 It is important to identify the "subject matter over which the 
fiduciary obligations extend": Birtchnell v Equity Trustees, Executors & 
Agency Co above n59, 408 per Dixon J. 
135 PD Finn above n126, 169. 
136 PD Finn above n126, 171. 
137 (1938) 82 P (2d) 1049. 
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information been imposed, then British American would most 
likely have been liable for breach, but by imposing only the 
conflict of duty and interest rule the Court effectively 
narrowed the scope for liability.
138 
VIII CONCLUSION 
The concept of a "joint venture" in New Zealand is wide. 
Joint ventures may in some cases be partnerships. Throughout 
this paper the term "joint venture" was used in the narrower 
sense as a business association which is not a partnership. 
Even using the term "joint venture" in this narrower sense, 
the types of relationships which come under the definition 
can be many and varied. 
For this reason no generalisations can be made as to the 
standard of conduct between joint venturers. One cannot 
assert that "joint venture" is one of the categories of 
relationships to which fiduciary obligations presumptively 
attach. If the joint venturers' relationship is fiduciary 
it is only because the circumstances of the particular case 
warrant the imposition of fiduciary obligations. This will 
depend upon whether the circumstances, viewed objectively, 
serve as a basis for a placing of trust and confidence in 
the alleged fiduciary. Once it is found that the 
relationship is fiduciary, the scope and application of the 
fiduciary duties will in most cases be very limited. 
138 P L Wiese abov e n130 , 191 . 
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